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DELIVERING GROWTH? EVALUATING ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE IN 
ENGLAND’S SOUTH-EAST SUB-REGIONS 
 
Abstract 
The UK Coalition Government’s commitment to ‘localism’ in Planning is in marked 
contrast to the emphasis on cross-boundary strategic planning initiatives under the previous 
Labour Government. Against this background the paper examines the implications of 
evolving economic governance arrangements in three sub-regional ‘soft-spaces’ in England’s 
South-East region. A distinctive evaluative frame derives a set of criteria for ‘good economic 
governance’ as perceived by the stakeholders concerned, and a judgement regarding the 
‘quality’ of economic governance in each case is presented. The conclusion triangulates these 
results against economic growth outcomes across the respective sub-regions. 
 
 
Keywords: Governance; Evaluation; Planning for Growth; Localism; Sub-regions; Soft-
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1. Introduction 
Since the election of the UK Coalition Government in May 2010 the landscape for sub-
national economic development in England has been comprehensively changed (Bristow, 
2013; Pugalis and Townsend, 2013). Alongside significant reductions in public spending, 
previous programmes for local and regional economic development were substantially 
removed to be replaced with a new set of structures and funding mechanisms, and new local 
freedoms and responsibilities. In terms of organisational change, sub-regional Local 
Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) were introduced in 2011,  reflecting particularly Conservative 
Party criticisms of the regional planning arrangements and Regional Development Agencies 
(RDAs) that had been introduced under the previous Labour administration. At the same 
time, the Government's localism agenda has introduced significant changes to the planning 
system as well as the institutional and policy landscape for economic growth. In Planning, 
major changes have taken place with the introduction of the Localism Act 2011 and the 
National Planning Policy Framework, effective from April 2012, as well as the Growth and 
Infrastructure Act 2013. Additionally, new experiments in urban governance have been 
introduced through ‘City Deals’ and ‘Growth Deals’, and new – or rediscovered – 
mechanisms have been established including Enterprise Zones (EZs), the Regional Growth 
Fund (RGF) and the Growing Places Fund. 
 
One outcome of this restructuring has been a question over the status of so-called ‘soft’ 
planning spaces, which had been introduced alongside the regional arrangements cultivated  
under Labour (Allmendinger and Haughton, 2007, 2012; Haughton et al, 2013). ‘Soft’ 
planning spaces are informal spatial arrangements which operate alongside formal spaces of 
planning and are related to such formal spaces in complex ways. Such spaces are highly 
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variable; writing at the tail-end of the New Labour era, Allmendinger and Haughton (2010: 
811-812), for example, differentiated between three distinct types of soft planning space on 
the basis of their respective motivations and objectives: ‘bottom-up functional’ spaces, 
where local actors prepare strategies and plans for functional areas which do not map onto 
formal regional or local planning territories; ‘shadow’ spaces which allow speedier and more 
flexible interpretation of formal, statutory plans; and ‘top-down functional’ spaces driven 
directly by central government initiatives. Hybrid forms combining these various 
characteristics were also evident. Yet despite such diversity, in the congested governance 
arena for Planning under New Labour it was increasingly these informal, soft-spaces where 
much strategic planning was actually done (Haughton and Allmendinger, 2008: 143). Indeed, 
soft-spaces not only introduced novel planning entities, but were also seen as vehicles for 
overcoming institutional and policy scleroses, introducing innovative thinking, and imagining 
the future. 
  
Certainly there are senses in which soft spaces represented alternative institutional forms in 
which to imagine possibilities for future place making and thereby construct a form of 
spatial imaginary (Haughton and Allmendinger, 2008: 143). However, it is also clear that the 
‘soft spaces of governance’ considered by Haughton and Allmendinger differ from a notion 
of ‘new political spaces’ where what is at stake is ‘the transformation of the entire political 
process’ (Boudreau, 2007: 2596). For Boudreau, in examining the creation of Toronto as a 
competitive global city-region, the strategic production of the Toronto region as a political 
space ‘depends on the mobilization of existing spatial imaginaries and the creation of new 
ones that resonate with residents and users of the city-region’ (op cit. 2597 emphasis added). Here: 
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Spatial imaginaries are mental maps representing a space to which people relate and 
with which they identify. They are collectively shared internal worlds of thoughts and 
beliefs that structure everyday life. They are thus different from spatial discourses in 
that discourses are ‘moments’ in the social process, they are repeated and uttered 
punctually, but they do not necessarily alter deeply held beliefs, fantasies, and desires in 
the long term. When discourses alter social practices and beliefs, they are ‘translated’ 
from ‘moments’ to ‘permanences’ in the social process (Harvey, 1996). They become, 
in other words, imaginaries. (Boudreau, 2007: 2596-2597) 
 
By way of contrast, a focus on ‘soft spaces of governance’ directs the focus less towards the 
construction of a political space open to political interaction and contest, and more towards 
the construction of new ‘regulatory space’ (Boudreau, 2007: 2601) designed to deliver 
specific outcomes. Soft spaces, in this sense, are not oriented towards ‘politics proper’ 
allowing for a genuine politicisation of spatial strategy, but select for largely pre-given 
strategic objectives within a market-oriented framework for spatial development (Haughton 
et al, 2013: 222-223). From this rather more prosaic standpoint attention is drawn more 
directly towards the efficacy of soft spaces in dealing with the practicalities of planning 
policy and implementation, and in negotiating with the regulatory functions of hard-space 
forms of governance with regard to finance, statutory powers, and democratic legitimacy 
(Allmendinger and Haughton, 2010: 812-13). 
 
In this context the focus of the current paper is on evaluating the efficacy of ‘soft regulatory 
planning spaces’ in the governance of sub-national economic growth. The emergence of soft  
regulatory planning spaces reflected the proliferation of planning initiatives at various spatial 
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scales, ostensibly to facilitate cross-boundary working and responsiveness to functional 
economic areas, but also to usher in significant policy change. Some of these spaces – 
including the three cases considered  here – emerged as sub-regional components of the 
Regional Spatial Strategy (RSS) process. In other instances these dovetailed with the enabling 
and financing of Multi-Area Agreements (MAAs) which were taken up by the most active of 
sub-regional planning groupings. Elsewhere, broader cross-regional cooperation saw the 
emergence of  supra-regional spatial planning initiatives, such as ‘The Northern Way’ 
(Goodchild and Hickman, 2006). Arguably, a measure of continuity exists here in the 
emphasis placed on the ‘Duty to Cooperate’ 
(http://planningguidance.planningportal.gov.uk/blog/guidance/duty-to-cooperate/) by the 
current Government alongside its localism agenda. However, it is evident that the revocation 
of the RSSs and regional tier bodies such as the RDAs, and the expectations set in train with 
the introduction of the localism agenda, have left these soft spaces and their fledgling 
patterns of governance somewhat exposed. A further question therefore arises here 
concerning the status of soft regulatory planning spaces in the context of the shift to 
localism.  
 
Against this backdrop the current paper sets out to evaluate the relative effectiveness of 
three  soft regulatory planning spaces in delivering growth in the South-East region of 
England, namely the areas covered by the ‘Partnership for Urban South Hampshire’ 
(PUSH), the ‘Gatwick Diamond Initiative’ (GDI), and ‘Science Vale UK’ (SVUK) in south-
central Oxfordshire. The cases were selected to facilitate comparison across a variety of 
spatial scales, leadership forms and governance structures within the context of the growing 
South-East region and where the emerging RSS (the ‘South East Plan’, SEERA, 2009) was 
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clearly directing significant housing and economic growth. The research consisted of a 
detailed review of published documents relating to spatial planning and economic 
development across the relevant local government and LEP areas, together with 25 semi-
structured interviews with officers and elected politicians from local government planning 
and economic development departments, LEPs, and business, civic and environmental 
organisations, between June 2013 to January 2014. This builds on previous investigation 
across two of the case-study areas (PUSH and SVUK) incorporating over 100 interviews 
during the previous 4 years. In developing our assessment a distinctive evaluative stance 
identifies a set of criteria against which ‘good economic governance’ can be judged. This 
framework examines the quality of economic governance as perceived by stakeholders, including 
a variety of considerations: the identity and image of the area; the clarity and detailing of 
development strategy; the ability to effectively prioritise development and investment; 
patterns of ‘ownership’ and stakeholder engagement; the clarity of the business agenda; 
wider political influence and leverage; resourcing; and monitoring/evaluation processes. 
These criteria derive from previous extensive research in the  case study areas, interviews 
conducted as part of this research, and web-based consultation as detailed further below. 
 
The paper is presented in five further sections. Section 2 introduces the overall question of 
evaluation in economic governance and establishes our particular approach and distinctive 
evaluative frame. Section 3 then introduces  our three cases and describes the respective 
governance scales, organisational forms and patterns of leadership that pertain; In Section 4 
we examine the evolving status and operation of such new spaces in setting planning policy 
in the developing context of localism. Section 5 then lays out our judgement on the likely 
impact of the diverse governance arrangements in delivering growth, highlighting the most 
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important  strengths and weaknesses in each case. Finally, a brief conclusion reflects on the 
results of the evaluation and provides an indicative triangulation of these results against 
economic growth outcomes across the respective sub-regions.  
 
 
2. Evaluating Economic Governance 
A long-standing objective of research on sub-national economic development has been to 
examine the efficacy of economic governance arrangements in delivering growth in 
particular territories (CfC, 2005; CFPS, 2014; Liou, 2007). However, there are considerable 
practical and conceptual challenges of undertaking such an evaluation. First, at a conceptual 
level, the notion both of ‘governance’ per se and its novelty has itself been subject to critical 
examination, not least with regard to questions of basic definition which clearly underpin 
evaluative work (Imrie and Raco, 1999; Ward, 2000). Bovaird and Loeffler (2003, p.293), for 
example, define local governance as ‘the way in which local stakeholders interact with each 
other in order to influence the outcomes of public policies’, focusing on ‘the interplay of 
structures, processes and other mechanisms which link networks of stakeholders’. This, 
though, is in contrast to alternative definitions of local governance which have proved 
problematic from the perspective of empirical analysis: 
 
Rhodes (1997: 53) stipulates that ‘governance refers to self-organizing, 
interorganizational networks’, which is so general that it is not clear how any evaluation 
of the quality of governance could be conducted. Kooiman (2003: 4) suggests: 
‘governance can be seen as the totality of theoretical conceptions on governing’, where 
he defines ‘governing’ as ‘the totality of interactions, in which public as well as private 
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actors participate, aimed at solving societal problems or creating societal opportunities; 
attending to the institutions as contexts for these governing interactions; and 
establishing a normative foundation for all those activities’. While Kooiman’s concept 
of ‘governing’ has strong similarities with our definition of ‘governance’, it is so all-
embracing… that it is difficult to see what boundaries could be drawn around it in 
empirical research (Bovaird and Loeffler, 2003: 293-294) 
 
These definitional difficulties are not eased in the context of soft regulatory planning spaces, 
where complex and dynamic interrelations amongst formal and informal arrangements, 
along with differentiated governance forms militate against any simplistic evaluative strategy. 
Moreover, such conceptual challenges are reinforced by further practical considerations.  For 
example, while we might seek to uncover the impact of governance arrangements on 
particular policy outcomes (such as numbers of new houses built, roads improvements 
delivered or skill-levels raised), there are at least four reasons why such judgement might be 
problematical. First, these outcomes are often – perhaps typically – very long-term, with 
large-scale developments and policy programmes often taking place over 5-10 years or 
longer. A snapshot at any particular time is unlikely to capture overall outcomes, even if (as 
in two of the cases in this research) the governance arrangements have been in place for a 
decade. Second, policy outcomes may be profoundly impacted by the wider context of 
national economic performance and macro-economic policy, as well as broader political and 
regulatory change. Third, and relatedly, is the question of attributing causality to sub-national 
economic governance arrangements, given the complexity and dynamism of processes which 
influence local economic growth. Fourth is the problem of the counterfactual, or capturing 
the likely outcomes that would have been produced had particular governance arrangements 
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not been in place. In practice, then, distilling the impact of governance arrangements on 
policy outcomes is not in any sense straightforward. 
  
 
In light of this, Bovaird and Loeffler deploy their particular definition to underpin empirical 
research which focuses on the ‘quality’ of local governance as perceived by the stakeholders 
concerned. This is necessarily a relative measure, with standards constructed by stakeholders 
themselves, but this in turn is seen as: 
 
…a strength of the approach, not a weakness, as it means that the assessment is 
grounded in the values and meanings important to the stakeholders, rather than being 
imposed or second-guessed by an uninvolved and therefore potentially insensitive or 
out-of-touch external assessor. (Bovaird and Loeffler, 2003: 294) 
 
In taking forward research on ‘good governance’, Bovaird and Loeffler identify key public 
governance principles, the assessment of which is based on how far these principles have 
been honoured in interactions between different stakeholders. These might include, inter alia: 
Democratic decision-making; citizen and stakeholder engagement; transparency and 
accountability; social inclusion and equality of opportunity for disadvantaged groups; fair 
and honest treatment of citizens; willingness and capacity to work in partnership; the ability 
to compete in a global environment; and respect for the rule of law, individual rights and 
diversity. While it is accepted that this approach clearly involves value-judgments, both in 
assessing each of the key elements and in aggregating them into a final ‘governance 
scorecard’, this does not mean, it is argued, that the process is entirely subjective. Rather, it is 
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a process of ‘structured and explicated subjectivity’, which can be analysed and contested, 
and which has the potential advantage of practical usefulness having been drawn from the 
insights of local stakeholders themselves. 
 
This approach resonates strongly with the question of evaluating economic governance, 
where the ‘quality’ of such arrangements is perceived differently by the range of stakeholders 
involved. In particular it may help to reveal the relative strengths and weaknesses of diverse 
governance forms, accepting that any cardinal measure of governance quality will be 
imprecise. Clearly there are limits to any exercise which reduces the relational interplay and 
complex negotiation of economic governance to a simple scorecard. However, we would 
argue that this approach may encourage reflection on comparative governance capacities and 
lays bare important differences of emphasis across cases. Therefore, in order to compare and 
contrast the efficacy of economic governance arrangements in the three case study spaces 
here, a set of criteria were constructed against which ‘good economic governance’ might be 
judged. An initial draft set of criteria was produced based on previous extensive research in 
the case-study areas, and further opinions were sought as part of the interview process in the 
current project. Draft criteria were also circulated via four relevant topic groups on the social 
networking site LinkedIn, eliciting useful responses from 15 planning and other local 
government practitioners and students. 
 
The evaluative frame (see Table 2 below) focuses on indicators relating to the efficient 
design of institutions for delivering economic growth, including the construction of a 
cohesive image/identity, the production of agreed strategy and detailed plans, the ability to 
prioritise objectives, patterns of ‘ownership’ and political leverage, levels of resourcing and 
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so on). The indicators were then grouped according to broader headings in order to 
reinforce comparative considerations. Each of the case study areas has been ‘scored’ against 
these criteria and a detailed rationale provided for each score, accepting that ‘governance’ is 
by its very nature a complex process based in social and institutional interaction, with all the 
uncertainties and dynamism that implies. The framework is, however, designed in part to 
recognise such imperfection by accepting the distinctive perceptions of diverse stakeholders. 
It was important, also, as an integral part of the evaluative process, that key respondents 
from each case study area were given a ‘right of reply’ and an opportunity to comment on 
the judgements made and rationale offered. A draft report was circulated for review to key 
local government and business respondents in each case. Additionally, we must recognise 
that the scoring represents a snapshot only of the relative ‘quality’ of governance at a 
particular moment in time (late-2013) and by its nature may be subject to rapid and 
significant change. 
 
 
3. Case Studies: Governance scales, organisational forms and patterns of leadership 
 
Table 1 summarises important contrasts between the three study areas in terms of the scale 
and form of governance. The diversity of the spaces is immediately apparent, ranging from a 
population of around 1 million covered by the PUSH area, to 60,000 in SVUK. While 
SVUK is located within a single county and incorporates parts of just two district councils, 
PUSH includes 11 local authorities. GDI is the sole case which cuts across county council 
boundaries, incorporating parts of West Sussex County Council and Surrey County Council. 
PUSH and GDI emerged earliest, in 2003-4, partly in response to the regional planning 
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agenda under the Labour Government of Tony Blair, while SVUK is a more recent 
initiative, from 2008. Each of these cases might be interpreted principally as ‘bottom-up 
functional spaces’ designed by local state or business interests to reflect functional economic 
areas which do not correspond with formal regional and local planning territories, though 
they each reference, in different ways, the evolving context of ‘top-down functional’ thinking 
throughout the New Labour period. We consider the evolution of each governance structure 
in turn. 
 
 
Table 1. Key facts for three case study areas 
 
 GDI SVUK PUSH 
Year 
introduced 
2003-4 2008 2003-4 
Population ~600,000 ~60,000 ~1m 
Local 
authority 
composition 
Two counties, 6 
local authorities 
Single County, 2 local 
authorities  
Single County, 11 local 
authorities  
Initial 
objectives 
An internationally 
recognised 
business location. 
Higher levels of 
business 
development. 
‘Skills escalator’ to 
match skills needs. 
Enhance new 
investment in high 
growth business. 
Maintain and 
improve transport 
accessibility. 
Hi-tech employment 
growth. Housing. 
Housing and 
employment growth; 
Raise contribution to 
national GVA. 
Improve skill levels. 
Additional employment 
floorspace. 
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Partnership for Urban South Hampshire 
To begin with, PUSH was a local government initiative, with no significant business 
involvement. The soft regulatory planning space of ‘urban South Hampshire’ in reality 
comprises a diverse set of local authorities and settlement types having two cities 
(Portsmouth and Southampton), a set of semi-urbanised or suburban authorities (such as 
Eastleigh, Fareham and Havant and Waterlooville) and a rural fringe which includes parts of 
the remaining authorities (see Figure 1). Across these areas the character of settlement and 
associated socio-economic complexion and political interests vary considerably. 
 
A South Hampshire sub-regional spatial strategy emerged under the local authority-led 
grouping from 2003-4. This was presented at the time in terms of the need to plan positively 
for growth rather than have (for example) housing figures imposed through the RSS process, 
though there is a strong sense that a growth-oriented strategy would not have been 
forthcoming had the ‘threat’ of imposition through regional planning not existed. Hence it 
displays signs of both ‘bottom-up functional’ and ‘top-down functional’ pressures (Phelps 
2012).  
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For a county with a long history of perceived reluctance to plan positively for population 
and economic growth the PUSH strategy represented a break in attitudes. The argument 
presented by local authority leaders, chief executives and chief planning officers was that the 
sub-region needed to seek growth in productivity to converge on the regional average, in 
some senses restating a point noted many years ago by Colin Buchanan and Partners (1966) 
that the  area had underperformed in economic terms. Against this backdrop the PUSH 
objectives were significant: 80,000 new dwellings to 2026 with the majority to be built in  
Portsmouth and Southampton, but with a significant tranche of 16,000 in two new Strategic 
Development Areas (SDAs) at Fareham and Eastleigh. 
 
The argument that economic growth would drive the need for additional housing and 
infrastructure – rather than simply accepting more housing per se – was one that PUSH were 
keen to make in their submission to the emerging  South East Plan (SEERA, 2009). At the 
same time, Hampshire County Council’s ‘Holding out for Hampshire’ campaign represented 
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the other side to the argument that more housing and population would not be acceptable 
without supporting infrastructure and economic growth. This reflects the perception locally 
of a long record of population and employment growth unaccompanied by infrastructure 
delivery in this sub-region, and the difficulties of ensuring such ‘concurrency’. 
 
The Solent LEP area is broadly coterminous with the PUSH area, with little controversy 
regarding the definition of the LEP  in 2011. Despite its size and the separate spatial 
planning challenges which have seen the Isle of Wight remain outside of PUSH, the 
inclusion of the island in the LEP area reflects the several ways it nevertheless forms part of 
a single economic region along with the mainland local communities in PUSH. 
 
 
Gatwick Diamond Initiative 
In contrast to PUSH, the GDI was established as a business-led joint venture by the then 
Surrey and West Sussex Economic Partnerships in 2003 to stimulate and maintain strong 
economic growth. On the face of it this particular ‘bottom-up functional’ drive would appear 
to be a major strength of planning for growth in this sub-region given the generalised lack of 
interest of business representative bodies in  local and strategic spatial planning across the 
South East. However, the private sector initiative here gradually merged with on-going local 
authority planning efforts under the RSS process to create the public-private partnership that 
is now GDI, and a Local Strategic Statement (LSS) was produced for the area only relatively 
recently in 2011. 
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Gatwick had previously been part of the ‘Western Policy Area’ in Regional Planning 
Guidance for the South East (RPG9), which had provided a regional framework for the 
preparation of local authority development plans. Subsequently the ‘Gatwick Sub-Regional 
Strategy Area’ was identified in the SEP, extending north to the edge of Redhill, east to East 
Grinstead, south to Burgess Hill and Haywards Heath, and west to Horsham with strong 
functional links with Redhill and Reigate to the north and Southwater to the west. This 
‘strategy area’ makes up most of the current Gatwick Diamond (see figure 2). The GDI does 
not have  formal boundaries but is broadly defined by a diamond-shaped area stretching 
between London and Brighton and extending west to Horsham and east to East Grinstead. 
It includes parts of two counties, and incorporates the Boroughs of Crawley, Reigate & 
Banstead, and large parts of Horsham, Mid Sussex, Mole Valley and Tandridge Districts. 
 
High levels of regional and to some extent national accessibility via road and rail, and 
international accessibility via the airport, make the GDI area a focus for growth. 
Surrounding statutory designations including the London green belt and South Downs 
National Park have effectively channelled growth pressures into the GDI area. Towns such 
as Horsham have had a long history of municipal entrepreneurialism dating back to the early 
1900s, and reinvigorated significantly during the 1980s. Additionally, established large-scale 
developments such as Gatwick Airport and Crawley New Town have reinforced the growth 
trajectory, including the build-up of the business community that has driven the GDI itself. 
As one respondent noted in interview, ‘… there has always been in this area a general 
presumption in favour of growth; there has never been any particular negativity’ (Private 
sector representative, 10 July 2013). Indeed, from the point of view of local conservation 
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interests the desired objective of the business community has been to leverage on such 
inherent growth pressures to fashion another ‘M4 corridor’ along this axis. 
 
 
Initial attempts to have a LEP designated corresponding to the GDI area evaporated with 
central government ministries indicating that this would be too small an area for a LEP. 
Instead the ‘Coast to Capital LEP’ (C2CLEP) that finally emerged (see figure 3) reflects a 
number of separate bids being put forward for LEPs across this part of the South East. 
These proto-LEPs represented rather different types of economy from those that are now 
incorporated into C2CLEP, the diversity of which far exceeds that of the GDI area. This 
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raises significant questions regarding the extent to which LEP activities dovetail with the 
growth aspirations of the GDI. For some, the fact that GDI is one among five different 
C2CLEP sub-regions is unproblematic since there is appropriate representation of each of 
the distinct economic areas on the LEP board. Others, however, note the challenges of 
coordinating spatial agendas and priorities across areas as diverse as Croydon, Gatwick, 
Brighton and rural and coastal areas. 
 
 
 
Science Vale UK 
The third case study here is SVUK, a relatively recent innovation (introduced in 2008) 
encompassing the towns of Didcot, Wantage and Grove, and the employment centres of 
Harwell Oxford, Milton Park and Culham Science Centre (CSC). The SVUK concept 
emerged at the tail end of the RSS era and the parallel enabling of cross-boundary 
agreements across local government districts (MAAs). The agenda nationally at this time was 
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upon encouraging sub-regional strategies for the delivery of employment and housing 
growth, with a corresponding recognition that many key growth areas would straddle 
existing local government boundaries. In this sense the notion of SVUK can be seen as 
facilitated by ‘top-down functional’ changes, though the initial impulse for the area reflected 
more parochial ‘bottom-up’ concerns specifically as a mechanism through which the Vale of 
the White Horse District Council (VOWHDC) might compete more effectively for funding 
allocations within Oxfordshire  The area was subsequently officially recognised in the SEP in 
2009. 
 
Following the introduction of the SVUK concept, moves were undertaken to substantiate 
the idea and to drive the project forward. SVUK was formalised in organisational terms as a 
partnership with a management board drawn from the district and county authorities, key 
landowners the UK Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA), MEPC Plc. (owners of Milton 
Park), the Science and Technology Facilities Council (STFC, located at Harwell), and the 
South East of England Development Agency (SEEDA), though serviced directly on a very 
limited basis predominantly by a single employee. A consultants report was commissioned in 
2007 to investigate the  economic potential of the area, though this served to underline the 
sense of relative neglect felt in the districts in the south of Oxfordshire since it argued that 
the competitive position of SVUK – its scale and image – would be constrained without 
direct reference to the universities and science parks in and around the city of Oxford to the 
north (SQW Consulting, 2007). In this way the SVUK notion must be seen within the 
particular context of local politics in Oxfordshire. 
 
 21 
It is estimated that SVUK accounts for about 4 per cent of total R&D employment in 
England and 13 per cent in the South East region. Harwell Oxford has transformed from 
the former government centre for civil nuclear power research under the UKAEA into a 
leading centre of science and technology business which now houses the Diamond 
Synchrotron, the UK’s largest investment in science for 40 years and ISIS, the world's largest 
pulsed neutron source, together with the STFC, the Rutherford Appleton Laboratory, the 
Medical Research Council and European Space Agency Space Centre amongst others, with 
more than 4,500 people working in around 150 organisations. Milton Park is one of 
Europe's largest multi-use business parks, hosting more than 160 companies employing 
around 6,500 people, with particular strengths in the bio-tech and ICT sectors. CSC hosts 
the UK's fusion research programme and until recently the world's largest fusion 
experimental facility, the Joint European Torus. Under RSS the SVUK area was 
programmed for significant expansion with approximately 12,000 net additional dwellings 
and 12,000 additional jobs planned by 2026 (OxonCC, 2010: 8), albeit in a dispersed, 
environmentally sensitive, semi-rural setting. 
 
 22 
 
The Oxfordshire LEP was launched in March 2011. In contrast to Government guidance, 
which had directed that new sub-regional LEPs would incorporate ‘groups of upper tier 
local authorities’ Oxfordshire was accepted as a ‘functional economic area’ per se. However, a 
corollary of this has been a perception that the LEP has been allied most closely with 
Oxfordshire County Council’s particular agendas in terms of overall economic and spatial 
strategy, a viewpoint reinforced in the eyes of some interviewees by the County Council’s 
primary role in supporting and resourcing LEP operations in its early years. The implications 
for SVUK are not necessarily negative, and indeed development of the SVUK area features 
prominently in LEP strategic priorities and day-to-day activities, though there remains 
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residual concern within the SVUK district authorities of undue County Council influence in 
certain policy areas and a question over the relative prioritisation of investment at SVUK 
given competing commitments across the County. 
 
 
 
To summarise then, South Hampshire represents the largest and most complex of these 
spatial planning agendas, comprising 11 very varied local authorities. SVUK is the smallest 
and seemingly  least complex of the areas in terms of the planning and LEP authorities 
involved, yet it is challenged by the specificity, isolation and separation of the three key sites 
that drive its economic growth, as well as the complex political realities in Oxfordshire. GDI 
has perhaps the greatest growth pressures resulting from London-related spill-overs, given 
its excellent road and rail access into London and internationally via Gatwick Airport. Its 
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situation is something akin to the pressures apparent in the M4 and M11 corridors 
emanating from London. 
 
 
 
4. The status and operation of new spaces in setting policy under localism 
 
After the emergence and gradual consolidation of the 3 soft regulatory planning spaces at 
sub-regional scale, the introduction of the localism agenda from 2010 suggested considerable 
uncertainty. The risk being that localism would license popular concerns over proposed 
housing and population growth, and in some cases prompt a return to an earlier reluctance 
to plan positively for future development. Indeed, across England contrasting approaches 
have subsequently been adopted by local authorities within established sub-regions. In time, 
this may weaken the coherence of such soft regulatory planning spaces and their ability to 
promote growth and development. To date, however, in each of the three case study areas 
there has been notable commitment to housing and employment land allocations established 
under the previous era of regional planning, though with some evidence of attenuation, most 
clearly in GDI. We describe the respective contexts in turn. 
 
In PUSH, despite some revision to detailed targets and figure work, the sub-regional strategy 
developed as part of the SEP has remained largely intact. Housing figures have been 
adjusted,  primarily to take account of housing units already built and to reflect the downturn 
in development activity since 2008. Thus, as the revised South Hampshire Strategy (‘SHS’, 
PUSH, 2012: 13) notes the target of 3,700 new homes per annum to 2026 is slightly lower 
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than the original SHS (2008). One notable change has been the abandonment of the 
Eastleigh SDA and the absorption of the houses allocated to that site elsewhere within the 
Borough due to  local opposition to housing, and concern over employment land being 
allocated to a single large site. Overall then, a figure of 80,000 homes for the period 2006-
2026 put forward in the PUSH submission to the SEP (2004) has reduced to a figure of 
55,600 from 2011 to 2026 in the revision in October 2012, largely reflecting delivery in the 
intervening years. 
 
Despite some revision, then, the overall strategic direction laid out in the SEP has been 
largely retained. To a degree the PUSH organisation itself has become somewhat attenuated 
in the context of localism, and one informed ex-DCLG interviewee argued that ‘PUSH is 
not the beast it was’ (Interview, 21 November 2013).  Nevertheless, it performs an 
important function for the exercise of strategic thinking among political leaders, chief 
executives and planning officers. Alongside the LEP it acts as a vehicle through which the 
evidence base for sub-regional planning is sustained, thereby providing an important 
benchmark for demonstrating implementation of the Government’s new ‘duty to 
collaborate’. In many senses, therefore, it exhibits ongoing capacity as a soft regulatory 
planning space. 
 
With regard to GDI, under the previous regional arrangements and the SEP, detailed 
housing targets and employment objectives were specified for sub-regional growth areas. For 
the Gatwick Sub-Regional Strategy Area, the RSS (2009) committed to an interim target of 
17,400 additional jobs between 2006 and 2016, with further monitoring and analysis required 
at the local level before targets were established beyond 2016. Net additional dwellings were 
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set at 36,000 between 2006 and 2026, with clear targets for individual local authority districts 
and specific housing allocations for particular sites across the sub-region. 
 
In order to understand the implications of the removal of regional planning here it is useful 
first to outline governance changes which had been underway in the GD area towards the 
latter stages of the previous Government and in the run-up to the general election of 2010. 
During this period the business-led organisation that had initiated GDI was merging into a 
public-private partnership in 2006-7, which itself then went through a further restructuring 
around 2008-9 to give it a stronger governance structure with an overview group including 
members from local authorities and a management board. This new governance structure 
brought forward a growth plan – the LSS – drawn around three strands: i) GROW (spatial 
planning, housing); ii) CONNECT (transport); iii) INSPIRE (mainly education). According 
to the senior planner involved in creating the LSS, 
 
That new governance created a much stronger link between business and the local 
authorities. And arising out of that we started to gain funding out of the GDI to take 
forward the local strategic planning work as a mechanism to support the drive of the 
local partnership which had developed. We then started to work on the policy 
framework including the LSS under the umbrella of the GDI (Interview, GDI, 18 June 
2013) 
 
The LSS was adopted in 2011, by all the relevant local authorities except Tandridge District 
Council. Yet what is absolutely clear is that the LSS was a wholly different document to the 
previous sub-regional strategy set out in the RSS, as the GDI Senior Planner highlighted: 
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The local authorities all signed up to the LSS. It post-dates the change in legislation 
and the turn to localism and so was driven in its latter stages by the emerging duty to 
cooperate. The very fact that five districts and two counties signed up to a strategic 
staement which provided a short and medium term direction but also then looked into 
the longer term future, I view that as a major success. There were differences, there 
were arguments. Things that might have been in there weren’t in there. It doesn’t go into 
numbers. It doesn’t specify locations. It doesn’t go into detail’. (emphasis added) 
 
Beyond this loss of detail and specific policy commitment, progress on local plans amongst 
district/borough councils has been uneven, with documents (at the time of writing) variously 
adopted (Mole Valley and Tandridge), submitted to the Secretary of State for consideration 
(Reigate and Banstead), not approved for submission (Crawley), submitted and subsequently 
withdrawn (Mid-Sussex), or still under development (Horsham). In light of this it is difficult 
to come to an overall judgement on the implications of localism in this case. Yet there is 
little doubt that previous specific growth commitments for the area have been called into 
question and it would be difficult to resist the conclusion that the planning policy 
foundations for economic growth are less solid. To some degree, therefore, the notion of 
GDI as an effective soft regulatory planning space has been eroded. 
 
Finally, with regard to SVUK the SEP identified ‘Central Oxfordshire’ as its sub-regional 
planning entity in Oxfordshire. Employment growth for the sub-region was seen as ‘difficult 
to predict’ but set a guide figure of a minimum 18,000 net new jobs from 2006 to 2016. 
There would be a need to ensure a balance of jobs and houses at both the sub-regional and 
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main settlement level to 2026, such that the housing market situation would not worsen. Key 
housing targets within the SVUK area itself were set at about 8,750 at Didcot and about 
3,400 at Wantage and neighbouring Grove by 2026, as part of the overall Central 
Oxfordshire target of 40,680 net additional dwellings. These figures represented a significant 
growth agenda in the SVUK area, not least given the semi-rural and village-based 
environment, and the historic infrastructural shortfall which goes along with this context. 
 
Despite the Government’s revocation of RSSs from July 2010 and the ensuing removal of 
housing allocations by many English local authorities, South Oxfordshire District Council 
(SODC) voted to retain previous housing growth commitments established under the SEP 
in the ‘submission version’ of its Core Strategy, adopted in November 2010. This was 
despite the rapid emergence of a new oppositional group – the ‘Didcot Ring of Parishes’ 
(DROP) – which sought to exploit the opportunities provided by localism and overturn the 
previous commitments (see author removed for a detailed account). In taking this decision, 
significant pressures in terms of affordable housing and infrastructure provision weighed 
heavily on SODC, as well as the need to plan for longer-term economic growth in the 
SVUK area. In addition, there was a clear sense that the Council was seeking to maintain 
some degree of control over future housing development, given the likelihood of speculative 
housing applications and a very uncertain legal context. Overall, it would appear that SVUK 
continues to find significant resonance as a soft-regulatory planning space, at least with 
regard to the overall growth trajectory established for the area. 
 
However, there is also evidence that localism has given rise to policy divergence between 
SODC and VOWHDC, as the two neighbouring authorities responded differently to the 
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new planning context. In part this is a question of timing; while SODC pushed through their 
Core Strategy in 2010-11, VOWH was later into the policy process and has subsequently 
faced significant challenges in progressing to submission in draft form in 2014. Also, though, 
there were emerging differences in strategic approach, which is interesting given the notion 
of a single ‘SVUK’ identity. While SODC housing allocations were dominated by growth 
allocations to Didcot and other towns in the district, for example, VOWHDC actively 
considered a hybrid strategy, including small and medium-sized allocations to larger villages 
as well as housing development on the edges of existing towns. This differentiation across 
the SVUK area poses questions regarding the coherence of the overall planning policy 
response, and associated patterns of physical and social infrastructure provision. 
 
 
5. Evaluating Economic Governance: GDI, SVUK and PUSH 
 
Table 2 presents scores for each case study area in terms of a number of indicators of good 
governance. The scores are on a scale from 1 to 5, with 5  indicating a situation that 
approaches the best conceivable, while 1 represents a situation that is unlikely to contribute 
significantly to delivery. We might note that very high scores are rather unlikely, given the 
negotiative character of economic governance, the range and complexity of criteria under 
consideration and the inherently subjective nature of judgements being offered by 
stakeholders. Accepting this, the rationale for the judgements in each case are presented 
further below, though for reasons of space we focus on the most important identified 
strengths and weaknesses in each case. 
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Table 2. Indicative scorecard of governance indicators for the three case study areas 
 
 GDI SVUK PUSH 
Image: 
Distinct and cohesive identity/image 3 2 1 
Strategy: 
Clear and agreed overall agenda/strategy 2 3-4 4 
Detailed plans, including spatial 
commitments 
1-2 3 4-5 
Ability to prioritise 
development/investment 
2 3-4 2-3 
Breadth of ownership: 
Stakeholder engagement 3 2-3 1-2 
Clear business agenda 4 3 1-2 
Political influence/leverage 3 3 3-4 
Resourcing and influencing delivery: 
Resources for spatial planning 1-2 1-2 3 
Influencing effective delivery 
(coterminosity etc) 
2 2 3-4 
Overcoming identified barriers 2 3 3 
Adaptive/reflexive capacity: 
Monitoring/evaluation processes 2 3 4 
 
 
GDI 
Starting with the Gatwick Diamond, it is evident that the simple spatial metaphor that 
emerged from the business community was effective in establishing a communicable identity 
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for the sub-region. This was picked up and used elsewhere, for example in SEEDA’s 
“diamonds for growth and investment”, though it appears less resonant internationally 
despite the presence of major international linkages and significant foreign investment. An 
effective identity also reflected particular strengths in terms of stakeholder engagement, in 
part through local authority buy-in, but most notably through the involvement of business 
interests from the very start. However, it is also arguable that some of the initial impetus 
provided by business has been diluted subsequently as a result of local authority politics and 
procedure, as GDI gradually evolved into a formalised public-private partnership. 
 
With regard to the overall growth agenda for the GD area there is a widely-shared desire on 
the part of both business and local government to address the perceived issue of economic 
under-performance and raising skills levels. However the clarity of the growth agenda has 
been eroded in the context of localism, given the loss of specificity in planning policy. This is 
justified with reference to the imposition of top-down housing numbers and detailed 
allocations under the previous regional arrangements, yet it is difficult to see the context here 
as anything other than a step backwards from the more specific commitments established by 
the SEP. The lack of certainty is further compounded by the question of airport expansion 
at Gatwick where until recently the debate had largely accepted that growth would be driven 
by Gatwick within its current configuration of a one runway, two terminal airport, alongside 
associated mitigation measures (GDI, 2012). However, the Airports Commission decision in 
December 2013 to include a second Gatwick runway as one of its three future options for 
airport capacity growth in the South East obviously has major implications (Airports 
Commission, 2013). At present there is little agreement locally regarding the second runway 
and the prospect is of on-going tension in local governance arrangements as a result of this 
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issue. This is likely to spill-over into questions regarding future development and investment 
priorities, which have shown some marked successes in terms of roads/rail improvement in 
the past, but which is currently in a period of flux given the impact of the recession and the 
on-going second runway debate. 
 
The lack of specificity in the LSS and the fact that the GDI is one of five areas within the 
LEP appears likely to represent a major challenge to the GDI itself being able to influence 
delivery. There is an acknowledgement that the Strategic Economic Plan of the C2CLEP is a 
balancing act not least due to the scale of the LEP area and the need to retain all interests 
but also over major investment issues such as the second runway and even housing numbers 
and their location. Housing and its spatial location is something that the LEP will most likely 
have to assume a greater role on in the near future. Arguably, however, the ability to draw 
down funding for concrete projects in the GDI area and indeed the monitoring and 
evaluation of the institutions that comprise governance arrangements in the GDI is critically 
exposed by the lack of numeric and spatial detail in the LSS. While C2CLEP has been active 
in supporting applications and applying for various funding streams and funding for projects 
under the RGF (round 4) which have been successful, these are not for projects applied for 
directly by the LEP itself and are not focused on the GD area. Moreover, in a recent 
comprehensive study of LEPs, C2CLEP’s performance in securing funding has been modest 
(Pike et al, 2013). 
 
Lastly here, the resources devoted to spatial planning work specifically within the GDI area 
have been modest, consisting of one senior planning officer working part time on the 
preparation of the LSS but able to draw on input from planners among the signatory local 
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authorities. This has left GDI with a relatively limited evidence base which is progressing 
slowly and behind the anticipated schedule due to the voluntary nature of a number of 
committees or working groups within the GDI umbrella. Additionally, the evidence 
regarding the extent to which the GDI has mobilised high-level political influence is 
relatively limited. 
 
 
PUSH 
The context at PUSH is very different. Here, the sub-region lacks a strong spatial metaphor 
or image around which ownership of a growth agenda can emerge. The ‘Solent’ label 
assumed by the LEP has not been used in the sub-regional spatial planning work of PUSH 
due to political sensitivities and is not necessarily one – despite the maritime heritage of the 
area – that resonates with the different populations that exist across the area. Additionally, 
the business voice within South Hampshire policymaking has been weak and episodic, with 
the business community reduced to expressing its passive support from the sidelines while 
PUSH’s submission to the SEP was prepared (Phelps, 2012). 
 
Yet it is a testament to PUSH that the potentially fragile local authority-dominated 
governance structure which emerged under the RSS era has remained intact with a revised 
sub-regional spatial plan which continues to shape the  context for  local authority core 
strategies. The strength of planning for and delivering on growth here lies in the agreement 
obtained over both a ‘cities first’ focus and detailed housing and employment numbers and 
associated land allocations which has remained intact after the revocation of the SEP. Apart 
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from the abandonment of the Eastleigh SDA , local authorities have remained signed up to 
the broad contours of PUSH’s submission to the SEP. 
 
In the context of localism’s ‘duty to cooperate’, the level of spatial detail contained in 
PUSH’s spatial plans has provided the glue binding the local authorities together. It also 
serves as a  benchmark against which to judge local authority plans coming forward and 
provides a strong foundation for monitoring activity. The commitment of some of the rural 
fringe authorities to housing numbers and housing and employment land allocations under 
the revised PUSH spatial plan may yet be tested in the local plan preparation process. 
However, the ‘cities first’ emphasis from the outset may minimise the likelihood of core 
strategies failing at Examination in Public on the basis of a duty to cooperate. 
 
In terms of resourcing there is a formal joint committee  with delegated powers created by 
the signatories to PUSH in advance of a special delivery vehicle to take forward  
developments envisaged in the RSS era. While there is some potential for overlap between 
PUSH and the Solent LEP, the thought was that PUSH would remain the vehicle for Chief 
Executive Officers, political leaders and Chief Planning Officers to provide the strategic 
thinking – including spatial planning – to which the LEP would work. In practice, this 
appears to have been the case with the LEP exerting a moderating influence rather than 
being a competing voice. In the era of localism,  staffing devoted to sub-regional or 
specifically PUSH-related spatial planning has inevitably dwindled after being boosted by 
growth point funding. However, one intriguing aspect of developments in South Hampshire 
is that the staff built up in anticipation of PUSH assuming a significant oversight and 
delivery role in spatial planning have  redeployed to other emerging organisations such as the 
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LEP. The former Chief Executive of PUSH is now the Chief Executive of the LEP for 
example, and there is a series of ‘overlapping directorships’ with local authority politicians 
and officers crossing PUSH spatial planning and LEP committees, thereby establishing a 
degree of consistency between the respective agendas. 
 
PUSH continues to enjoy a measure of reputation in central government circles. While the 
area has had few direct political connections to central government via local MPs holding 
significant portfolios, PUSH emerged as  a model of best practice under the RSS process 
among civil servants in Whitehall. It was allocated growth point funding to further its work 
and was clearly regarded as one of the more mature efforts by local government to 
coordinate spatial planning efforts in the UK, with one of the better evidence bases to draw 
upon (Phelps, 2012). The fact that the two cities were invited to bid for City-Deal funding 
also kept  PUSH  on the radar of government. Additionally, the Solent LEP has been  active 
in securing support for various concrete developments envisaged under PUSH spatial plans. 
To this end the LEP has been directly and indirectly successful in securing RGF, Growing 
Places and City Deal funding.  
 
One of the main criticisms of the PUSH growth agenda was a concern over  limited levels of 
public consultation. With the exception of presentations to civic societies and the like, 
systematic public consultation took place only after the spatial plan had been agreed. 
However, PUSH had become a less closed organisation by the time of the publication of the 
SEP, with minutes and agendas published and meetings opened to the public. The detailed 
planning of the one remaining SDA at North Fareham provides some indication of a greater 
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stakeholder engagement with a standing conference established to feed in a variety of 
stakeholder views, for example.  
 
SVUK 
As the discussion above indicated, SVUK draws together three dispersed and relatively 
distinct science and business parks which have grown on the sites of former military bases 
and UKAEA installations. The area therefore differs radically from the ‘international 
campus-garden-suburb style’ of suburban technopoles which has come to prominence in 
high-tech developments throughout the world (Forsyth and Crewe, 2010). In contrast, the 
three major elements of SVUK are perhaps better regarded as ‘camps’ rather than 
‘campuses’ (author removed: 2010, 2014) arising from a largely accidental planning history and 
situated separately against a green, semi-rural background. In turn, they have been lacking 
historically in terms of coordinated and comprehensive planning, and are characterized by 
significant infrastructural shortfalls. 
 
In this context the image of SVUK per se is evolving, and the overall sense of identity and 
cohesion amongst the major sites is not fully developed. The spatial metaphor introduced 
here has clear resonance locally and in the regional and sub-regional context, though the 
diverse and geographically separated nature of the science/business parks is evident and 
there remains an underlying question regarding the relationship with the wider image of the 
science-base in Oxford and Oxfordshire as a whole. 
  
Notwithstanding this  the growth agenda at SVUK is generally clear and established. Overall 
employment and housing targets  laid out in the SEP have been largely maintained, and 
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despite the differences noted above in more detailed housing allocations,  forecast levels of 
housing and employment growth have been  robust. Accepting  ongoing questions over 
strategic cohesion, other aspects of detailed planning have moved forward, including the 
successful development of a Local Development Order at the SVUK EZ based in Harwell 
and Milton Park. 
 
With regard to development and investment priorities there has been a relatively clear and 
established set of proposals in place since the SEP era in the late 2000s. Yet the major 
question here is less one of prioritisation within SVUK, but rather one of delivery. Indeed, a 
sense of the challenge here might be gauged by the withdrawal of £62 million from the 
County Council’s transportation budget by the Department of Transport in 2010. This 
removed support for the ‘Access to Oxford’ project agreed by the Labour Government in 
2007, a major package of investment incorporating expansion of Oxford railway station and 
measures to tackle congestion on the A34 and the city’s ring road. The withdrawal of ‘the 
largest sum for transport ever handed to Oxfordshire’ (Oxford Mail, 29th October 2010) 
would have direct and indirect impacts on transportation issues at SVUK. In this context the 
delivery of sub-regional infrastructure priorities is increasingly reliant on the ability to 
generate significant planning obligations (Section 106 and CIL monies) and the capacity to 
influence the priorities of LEP and the County Council in particular. Yet here SVUK faces 
competing priorities within Oxfordshire, and the overall backdrop of major public sector 
spending cuts which have already had significant impacts on infrastructure delivery. 
 
‘Ownership’ of the SVUK project is generally  well-developed, with strong buy-in from the 
relevant district councils and appropriate backing from the County Council and the LEP. 
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Business interests have been largely supportive, though there is no business representative 
group for the SVUK area per se, and an interesting potential divergence exists between 
Milton Park and Harwell Oxford which are owned by different commercial interests and 
operate at least to some degree in opposition. Meanwhile, SVUK has strong but perhaps 
relatively narrow leverage within central government. Regular visits and interest from 
Cabinet members clearly reference the perceived importance of the area to ‘UK Plc’ and the 
central position of science and R&D to the Government’s economic strategy. Yet the 
translation of such support into significant and transformative investment in infrastructure 
improvements, for example, is less immediately apparent, particularly in the context of on-
going national austerity.  
 
Summary 
In some respects the results here are counter-intuitive since the area with the strongest 
business voice and the strongest identity – GDI – emerges as the weaker case in terms of its 
likely ability to deliver on growth as part of a sub-regional strategy. Although the area 
emerged early  as a result of initiative from a large and active business community, it exhibits 
the weakest economic governance structure, particularly in light of the erosion of previous 
detailed plans, and limitations in terms of strategy-making and delivery. The interesting 
implication here being that a strong spatial imaginary which resonates with a range of actors 
and might potentially alter convictions about an area might be less important in the context 
of soft regulatory planning spaces than a detailed and agreed set of policy commitments with 
which to negotiate the tensions of practical policy-making and implementation, particularly 
in the era of localism. 
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In line with this, PUSH emerges as the strongest area in terms of its governance 
arrangements. There are a number of contributory factors to this, including: the scale of 
resources that have been devoted to spatial planning itself and allied generation of an 
evidence base which in no short measure has derived from local government contributions; 
the extent to which members have been able to agree to specific spatial commitments to 
issues such as housing and employment land allocations; the near coterminosity between the 
PUSH and LEP areas and a strong measure of interlocking directorships which appear likely 
to ensure a high degree of coordination between public and private sectors. SVUK emerges 
somewhere in between the two other cases in its capacity to  operate as an effective soft 
regulatory planning space. 
 
6. Conclusion 
As we have argued above, there are major challenges in examining the efficacy of economic 
governance arrangements in delivering growth in particular territories. Hence our adopted 
focus on criteria for ‘good economic governance’ as perceived by stakeholders concerned. It 
is possible, however, to provide some indicative triangulation of results, focusing on 
economic growth outcomes across the respective territories, and secondly on resourcing for 
economic growth. 
 
Firstly here, the Office for National Statistics has recently reported (ONS, 2015: Table 7) 
that the average annual growth in GVA per head for LEP areas (2003-2013) saw Solent 
ranked joint 6th out of 39 (2.9% p.a.), Oxfordshire joint 10th (2.7%), and Coast to Capital 
21st (2.6%). These territories do not correspond directly to the boundaries of our respective 
soft spaces, though the overall pattern here is broadly in line with our assessment. Secondly, 
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in terms of accessing resources it is difficult to judge the efficacy of governance 
arrangements per se, given that higher levels of support are generally directed to areas of 
lower productivity and prosperity. Allocations of 2014-2020 European Structural Funds, for 
example, which significantly outweigh RGF and the Growing Places Fund, equate to £23 
per head over 6 years in Solent, £25 in Oxfordshire, and around £30 in Coast to Capital, all 
substantially lower than areas such as Liverpool City-Region (£126) and the North East LEP 
area (£239). Accepting this, a recent study of all LEPs reported that Solent LEP compares 
favourably with others in the South East region (Pike et al, 2013). When totalling all of the 
various sources of funding under the ‘strategic influence’ of LEPs, Solent LEP ranked 21st, 
ahead of Coast to Capital at 28th, with Oxfordshire second to last at 38th (reflecting in part 
the smaller scale of the area). 
 
The contribution of soft regulatory planning spaces in achieving these outcomes is difficult 
to appraise. However, the detailed evaluation presented in this paper illuminates the views of 
key stakeholders in each case. It thereby illustrates the perceived strengths and weaknesses of 
a variety of sub-regional governance forms, and throws into sharp relief the comparative 
performance of these forms across a wide range of economic governance characteristics. 
The focus on stakeholder perceptions is valuable in terms of understanding the real-world 
implications of changing governance arrangements, such as the shift to localism. Although 
this paper cannot delve fully into the ongoing deliberations of all 22 of the local authorities 
involved across these sub-regions, it is apparent that the implications of localism are diverse. 
It is also possible that planning for these soft regulatory planning spaces may be overtaken 
by other territorial organsations such as LEPs, or even wholly redrawn under a new 
constitutional settlement in the wake of the Scottish referendum result in September 2014 
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and the Conservative election victory in May 2015. Certainly debates over city-regionalism, 
combined local authorities, larger-than-local planning and forms of pan-regionalism have 
been sharpened in recent times. In this context, there is little sign at present of settled 
arrangements for sub-regional planning in England. 
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